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In the United States, drug safety and efficacy are primarily regulated by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and the legal system, which gives manufacturers large incentives to produce safe drugs and
provide proper warnings for side effects, since patients can sue manufacturers that provide unsafe
drugs and/or insufficient warnings.
In this paper, we begin by examining the efficiency implications of this joint regulation of drug safety.
We find that joint regulation of drug safety can be inefficient when the regulatory authority mandates
a binding and well enforced level of safety investment.  In this case, product liability has no effect
on a firm's safety investment, but affects welfare by raising a firm's costs and therefore prices.  Using
these results, we calibrate a model of the pharmaceutical market and find that, depending on the share
of liability costs in marginal costs, a product liability exemption for activities that are well regulated
by the FDA could increase consumer welfare by $47.8-$754.7 billion annually (4-66 percent of sales)
and producer welfare by $11.9-$173.9 billion annually (1-15 percent of sales).
In addition, we summarize the welfare effects of recent legislation, the Prescription Drug User Fee
Acts (PDUFA), which mandated faster FDA review times in exchange for user fees levied on the pharmaceutical
industry.  Overall, we find that the faster review times mandated by PDUFA raised social surplus by
$18-31 billion, and that at most, the concomitant cost of reduced drug safety was $5.6-$16.6 billion.
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In virtually all developed countries and many undeveloped ones as well, regulatory 
authorities provide public oversight of the safety and efficacy of many medical products and 
foods.  In the United States, such oversight is conducted by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), which regulates drugs, medical devices, biologics (products made from living organisms, 
like vaccines and blood products), cosmetics, radiation-emitting electronic products, veterinary 
products, and foods.  The FDA regulates all food products except meat and poultry, which are 
regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture, although the FDA regulates game 
meats.  According to the FDA, the products it regulates account for more than one-fifth of U.S. 
consumer spending. In the area of medical products, the agency is responsible for determining 
whether marketed products are both safe and effective before and after they have been marketed.  
  Compared to many other regulatory agencies, relatively little research has been done by 
economists on the efficiency tradeoffs involved with the FDA, although existing analyses 
include Peltzman (1973) Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas (1978), Wiggins (1981), and 
Schwartzman (1976). It is somewhat ironic to conjecture that if a product application was 
supplied to the FDA with the scant amount of analysis or evidence that currently exists on the 
efficiency or performance of the policies of the agency itself, such an application would clearly 
be rejected on the basis of insufficient analysis or evidence. In this paper we discuss and 
summarize in a non-technical manner recent research on the FDA that sheds new light on 
whether the policies of the agency itself are safe and effective. Although the discussion is 
specific to the FDA, some of this research could potentially apply to other areas of regulation as 
well, such as e.g. transportation.   3
  We begin with some background on the statutes and regulations that govern the Food and 
Drug Administration. We then stress two static and dynamic issues that seem fundamental to the 
efficiency of the FDA.  The static issue concerns the potential inefficiency of the duality of 
product safety laws when such functions are performed not only by the FDA but also by the 
private sector in a complimentary way through product liability law.  Put another way, what is 
the rationale for using product liability and the FDA to regulate drug safety?  While intuitively it 
may seem that two systems must be better than one in ensuring drug safety, it is important to 
remember that each system comes with costs, so patients can be harmed by the inefficient 
duplication. When product liability law attempts to ensure safety already assured by the FDA, 
prices may be inefficiently high due to liability costs that do not deter manufacturers from 
producing unsafe products.  Due to this duplication inefficiency, we will argue that the benefits 
of a product liability exemption for products that have passed through FDA approval could be 
potentially large.   
We then turn to the dynamic issue, which concerns the extent to which higher safety is 
achieved at a cost of later market entry of effective and even life-saving products. After 
considering the general tradeoffs involved, we discuss the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts 
(PDUFA), which raised the speed of the agency’s regulatory process starting in 1992, although 
according to some, at the cost of reducing drug safety.  We discuss recent work that that argues 
that the increased speed offered greater benefits than the corresponding decrease in safety.  We 
conclude by suggesting a research agenda for future work on the Food and Drug Administration. 
 
Background on the Regulation and Liability of Medical Products 
Regulation of Medical Products through the FDA   4
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in an executive-branch agency that is led by a 
Commissioner who is appointed by the president, with Senate confirmation, and who reports to 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  The current commissioner is Andrew von 
Eschenbach, a doctor who before coming to the FDA in 2006 ran the National Cancer Institute 
for four years. The Commissioner oversees an agency with 9,000 employees and a current 
budget of roughly $2 billion.  Generally, speaking, the role of the FDA is to ensure the safety and 
accurate labeling of the products that it regulates. With respect to drugs, biologics, and medical 
devices, the FDA is additionally charged with ensuring the efficacy of these products. 
The FDA’s statutory authority comes from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
(FDCA), which was passed in 1938 in response to public outcry over deaths from the drug Elixir 
Sulfanilamide, a drug used to treat streptococcal infections.  While Elixir Sulfanilamide was safe 
in tablet and powder forms, in 1937 the S.E. Massengill Co. released a liquid form which 
contained a lethal solvent in its preparation.  As a result, over 100 people died, including many 
children.  The FDCA mandated regulatory approval of new drugs before they could be sold.  
Before marketing a drug, firms were required to submit a New Drug Application to the FDA 
establishing the safety of their products.  If the FDA was not convinced of a drug’s safety, then it 
had 180 days from the receipt of the application to block the drug’s introduction into the market.  
In addition, the law required that new drugs be accompanied by appropriate labeling for safe use.  
The FDA used this latter requirement to introduce the notion of prescription drugs, as it ruled 
that some drugs could not be safely used without a physician’s prescription. The distinction 
between over the counter and prescription drugs was formalized by the Durham-Humphrey 
Amendment of 1951.      5
The 1962 Kefauver amendments to the FDCA notably strengthened the agency’s 
regulatory power.  First, the amendments removed the 180 day time limit, so now no drug could 
enter the market unless the FDA gave its explicit approval.  Second, the Kefauver amendments 
required drug manufacturers to prove the safety and efficacy of a drug prior to marketing.  
Finally, the Kefauver amendments gave the FDA control over the drug testing process itself.  
Now, manufacturers were required to submit their drug testing plans to the FDA, and the agency 
had the right to mandate changes in a firm’s testing plan. 
  The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 was the next major piece of legislation 
affecting the drug approval process. It allowed to the FDA to levy user fees from firms filing a 
New Drug Application or Biologic License Application, in exchange for guarantees on review 
times. This legislation was subsequently renewed as part of the Food and Drug Modernization 
Act of 1997, and then again as part of the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act in 
2002.  The guarantee on review time is not a guarantee of approval; rather, it is a guarantee that 
the FDA will take action on (most) applications within a specified period of time.  In particular, 
within the specified period, the FDA must issue one of three possible actions: 1) a “non-
approvable” letter indicating that the application has not satisfied the FDA’s standards for safety 
and/or efficacy; 2) an “approvable” letter that indicates the application can be approved if certain 
deficiencies and questions are acted upon by the sponsor; 3) an ultimate approval letter that gives 
the sponsor company the right to market the drug to the public.  Submissions for new drugs or 
biologics are assigned either a “standard” or “priority” status, depending in part on their novelty 
and on the existence of unmet needs.  The FDA is required to deliver a “complete review” on 90 
percent of priority applications within six months.  For standard applications, the FDA was   6
obliged to review 90 percent of applications in twelve months under the 1992 law;   currently, 
the FDA is mandated to review 90 percent of standard applications within ten months.   
The user fees levied by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 and its continuing  
legislation can be quite substantial.  In the initial fiscal year 1993 user fee schedule (all costs 
shown here are in 2007 dollars), applications with clinical data were assessed a one-time fee of 
$141,000; each supplemental application with clinical data, and applications with no clinical 
data, $70,414; annual manufacturing establishment fees were $58,011, and annual product fees 
were $8,449.  By fiscal year 2004, applications with clinical data were assessed a one-time fee of 
$617,822 (a 338 percent increase since 1992) ; each supplemental application with clinical data, 
and applications with no clinical data, were assessed a user fee of $308,911  (338 percent 
increase); annual manufacturing establishment fees were $244,328 (321 percent increase), and 
annual product fees were $6,463 (7 percent increase).
1 
  Figure 1 presents an overview of the U.S. drug development process. In the first stage, 
preclinical toxicology trials, the FDA has not yet entered the picture, but the firm is studying and 
testing the properties of a potential new drug by looking at chemical evidence, animal studies, 
foreign experience, use of the drug for treating other conditions, and the like.  The government 
drug approval process begins when a firm files an Investigational New Drug application, which 
requests permission from the FDA to conduct clinical trials on humans.  Typically, this 
application contains the available preclinical information, as well as protocols for the drug’s 
clinical trials.   
                                                 
1 Waivers and exemptions are granted to small firms, and to sponsors submitting an application under the Orphan 
Drug Act of 1983. U.S. Food and Drug Administration [2004], “Prescription Drug User Fees—Overview”, U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration [online] (cited 27 April 2004), at <http://www.fda.gov.oc/pdufa/overview.html>. 
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Once the FDA gives its approval, the firm may begin conducting clinical trials for the 
drug, which proceed in three phases.  Phase I trials seek to evaluate a drug’s safety and to obtain 
data on a drug’s pharmacologic properties.  Typically, these trials enroll small numbers (20-80) 
of healthy volunteers.  Phase II testing then enrolls slightly larger (100-130) numbers of sick 
volunteers, seeking to begin investigating a drug’s efficacy and optimal dosage, and to monitor 
the drug’s safety in diseased patents.  Finally, Phase III testing typically involves larger numbers 
(more than 1,000) of sick patients and is the most costly stage of the approval process.  Phase III 
testing seeks to establish more definitively the efficacy of a drug, as well as to discover any rare 
side effects.  Upon the completion of Phase III testing, the firm submits a New Drug Application 
to the FDA, which is accompanied by the results of the clinical trials.  The FDA may then reject 
the application, require further clinical testing, or approve the drug outright.   
In addition to issuing approval of the drug, the FDA must also approve the label that 
accompanies it.  This label typically provides information on the drug’s pharmacologic 
properties (such as the rate at which the drug enters and exits the body), contraindications 
(medical conditions that preclude use of the drug) and side effects, as well as brief summaries of 
the clinical trials reported to the FDA.  Perhaps most importantly, the label also lists the 
indications (or diseases) that the drug is approved to treat.  Thus, approval by the FDA is not 
merely approval of the drug, it is approval of the drug for specific uses. If a firm wishes to obtain 
approval for additional indications, it typically must begin a new set of clinical trials for those 
indications. Use of a drug for an indication not listed on the label (“off-label use”) is not illegal, 
and indeed occurs regularly in many areas, such as oncology.  However, it is illegal for a 
manufacturer to advertise a drug for a non-approved indication.  In addition, insurers may not 
always pay for off-label use of a drug.     8
Following approval, a drug enters post-market surveillance, also known as phase IV 
testing.  During this time, manufacturers conduct additional studies that the FDA may require to 
assess long term safety.  In addition, drug firms, physicians and patients can report any suspected 
adverse reactions from a given drug to the Medwatch/Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), 
which is monitored by the FDA, which can then choose to withdraw its approval for a drug if it 
believes that a drug is unsafe. 
Figure 1 provides the average cost and length of time for each phase of clinical testing 
(Dimasi et al., 2003).  In addition, the percentages near the bottom of the figure provide the 
conditional and unconditional probabilities of success at each stage of the development process. 
Notice that that later stages of clinical testing become progressively longer and more expensive, 
especially in Phase III.  Overall, the drug development process is extremely time consuming, as 
the clinical and approval phases combined can take 6.6 to 13 years.  In addition, the process has 
a low probability of success: only 8 percent of drugs for which an Investigational New Drug 
application is filed ultimately receive FDA approval.  Most of this attrition occurs early on in the 
process. Only 40 percent of drugs for which an Investigational New Drug application is filed 
progress to Phase I testing, while 90 percent of drugs for which a New Drug Application is 
submitted after Phase III receive approval.  Also, most of the drug approval process is taken up 
by the clinical testing required prior to submission of the New Drug Application, as opposed to 
the review process of that evidence by FDA itself. This pattern suggests that the FDA favors 
safety over speed, as the drug approval process is rather lengthy.  The drugs the agency approves 
tend to be quite safe, in the sense that the agency or private firms seldom withdraw drugs from 
the market. For example, among the drugs approved by the FDA between 1979 and 2002, only 
2.5 percent were late withdrawn from the market (Philipson et al, 2005).   9
 
Product Liability for Drugs 
While the FDA is the primary and most visible player in drug safety regulation, the 
product liability system also plays a role in ensuring drug safety by allowing patients to sue 
manufacturers for unsafe drugs. If a patient experiences an adverse event from a drug, product 
liability law allows him to sue the firm to recover any damages from the adverse event.  Lawsuits 
over unsafe drugs can generally proceed under one of three theories of legal liability.  The first is 
defective design; that is to say, the patient can sue on the basis that the firm designed an 
inherently unsafe drug.  Second, patients can sue for defective manufacturing of an otherwise 
safe drug.  Finally, patients can sue for defective warnings.  In other words, they can sue if they 
can show that the drug company failed to warn them of the possibility of an adverse event, if it 
can be established that the firm knew or should have know about that possibility. 
Given that the FDA approves both the safety of the drug itself and the sufficiency of the 
warnings in the drug label, firms have tried to use FDA approval as a shield against product 
liability suits. Generally speaking, Garber (1993) finds that courts have used FDA approval as a 
shield for lawsuits over defective design.  The reason for doing so stems from a widely cited 
comment included in Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that drugs are an example of an 
“unavoidably unsafe product,” in other words, drugs are not generally unreasonably dangerous, 
and the dangers associated with them are not evidence of defects in the drugs themselves.  
However, for medical devices, rather than drugs, design lawsuits are more common. 
The vast majority of drug lawsuits to date have been for manufacturing or failure to warn, 
and here, courts have in general held that FDA approval of the warnings on the label does not 
provide a shield against liability lawsuits. With regards to warnings, compliance with FDA   10
regulations is generally regarded as a minimum standard, so that a firm that does not comply 
with the FDA is extremely vulnerable to lawsuits.  However, compliance with the FDA does not 
shield a firm against lawsuits.  It is important to note that the FDA maintains tight control over 
the information that a firm can release about a drug, including the release of warnings.  For 
example, the FDA can prohibit the firm from adding a warning to the product label.  Even if the 
FDA prohibits the firm from adding a warning, the firm can still be found liable for failing to 
warn consumers (Garber, 1993; Calfee, 2006).  Lawsuits against firms proceed under state laws, 
and therefore, the determination of whether the firm knew, or should have known, about a 
particular risk is based on state-specific legal standards.  If the patient prevails at the trial, he can 
recover compensatory damages for the adverse event, as well as punitive damages, if it is found 
that the firm intentionally hid evidence from the FDA. 
While estimates of the costs of liability for pharmaceuticals are few, there are indications 
that liability costs are not trivial, especially when viewed as a share of marginal costs.  For 
example, a report prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers (2002) found that in 2000, 
liability costs across all US industries were $180 billion, or roughly 1.8 percent of GDP.  The 
same report suggested that the inefficiencies from the liability system were equivalent to the 
inefficiencies that would occur from a 2 percent increase in consumption taxes, a 3 percent tax 
on wages, and a 5 percent tax on capital income.  In the area of drugs and medical devices, less 
evidence exists. Manning (1994) identified liability costs for the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus 
vaccine by comparing changes in the vaccine’s price against changes in the price of the 
diphtheria-tetanus vaccine.  Because the only difference in the vaccines is the pertussis 
component, which adds a negligible cost to the production price of the vaccine and was the 
subject of numerous lawsuits, the difference in price between the two vaccines can serve as a   11
useful estimate of liability costs.  Manning’s estimates suggest that at their peak, liability 
accounted for roughly 90% of the price of the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine’s price.  In 
addition, in related work (Manning, 1997), Manning finds that differences in product liability 
regimes can explain much of the difference in the Canadian and US prices of drugs.  It is 
important to note that from an economic perspective, what is most important is the fraction of a 
drug’s production costs (excluding fixed costs such as R&D) that are devoted to legal costs.  If 
this fraction is large, then policies that affect firms’ legal liability will have larger effects on 
prices and welfare.  Given that the marginal cost of physically producing a drug is generally 
thought to be low, even if legal costs are also low, they may still account for a significant portion 
of total production costs. 
 
Static Efficiency and Duplication of Safety Interventions  
The first static issue in evaluating a given regulatory regime is to consider how much it 
affects the safety of the product being provided. In the case of the FDA, this evaluation is 
complicated by the fact that the safety of medical products is governed both by a regulatory 
agency and by product liability law. The second dynamic issue is to consider the tradeoff 
between greater safety and speed to market. Over time the optimal choice of safety or efficacy 
must balance the gains from increased safety against the losses from delayed introduction of the 
drug.   In the next two sections we will consider these two aspects in turn.  
Product Liability and Regulation for Medical Products 
  In general, one may think of torts as a method to force a potentially negligent party to 
internalize the full social costs of its actions, since forcing the potentially negligent party to face 
the expected costs of its harm gives it an incentive to carry out precautionary activities.  For   12
example, in the absence of torts, drivers may not have the proper incentives to avoid accidental 
harm to pedestrians; torts give drivers a heightened incentive to avoid such accidents.  This 
“Pigouvian tax” interpretation of torts is appropriate for activities that are not taking place in a 
market context, like automobile accidents, where there are no prior market transactions between 
those potentially inducing harm and those being harmed. However, for the regulation of unsafe 
products and product liability, the Pigouvian tax interpretation of torts becomes more 
problematic, because there is a market transaction between the potentially negligent party (the 
seller) and the buyer. Thus, in addition to analyzing how torts affect the incentives to cause 
harm, it is also important to consider how torts affect prices and output. 
  A longstanding literature in economics considers whether and under what circumstances 
regulation can produce more efficient behavior than liability alone.  In effect, this literature bears 
on the analysis of FDA by seeking to explain why so many governments have sought to regulate 
the safety of medical products, as opposed to relying on product liability alone. Direct pre-
market regulation of safety may be desirable if product liability is in some way incomplete in 
providing the correct deterrence for producing unsafe products. There are several reasons why 
product liability may be an incomplete deterrence mechanism in general, and for medical 
products in particular.  
First, product liability will be an incomplete deterrent to the extent that firms can evade 
judgments against them through limited liability. For example, unsafe medical products can lead 
to very large losses among consumers, because health and life are valued highly.  As a result, 
firms may be able to avoid judgment by declaring bankruptcy (Shavell, 1987).  Moreover, when 
losses are large, firms have greater incentives to distort the liability system, in a way that makes   13
that system likely to deter less than it should -- which is one explanation for the change from 
liability to regulation over time (Glasear and Shleifer, 2003).   
  Second, with many medical products, it is often difficult to establish whether the firm is 
at fault, because patients who suffer serious losses from a given drug often have other cofactors 
which predispose them to injury. As a recent example, Merck, the maker of Vioxx, is being sued 
by patients because of the increased risk of heart attacks associated with Vioxx usage.  However, 
many patients who used Vioxx often had several other risk factors for heart attacks, therefore 
making it difficult for the jury to determine whether a given heart attack was caused by Vioxx 
itself.  More generally, if consumers are imperfectly informed, then governments, or a private 
third party, may economize on the costs of verifying product quality.  
Third, new medical products that are the focus of safety and efficacy interventions are 
provided by firms with patent protection and market power.  As argued in Philipson and Sun 
(2007), in such cases safety may be under provided by a monopolist under product liability for 
related reasons to under-provision of quality by monopolists more generally Tirole (1998). 
Fourth, regulation is a fixed cost for each product, while litigation can involve costs 
proportional to the number of those potentially harmed, which makes regulation more favorable 
for larger economies and populations (Mulligan and Shleifer, 2006).  
These considerations favor regulation of medical products rather than product liability 
alone. Nevertheless, most countries have not selected the corner solutions of one regime over the 
other. Therefore, what needs to be better understood is how these regimes operate in conjunction.  
 
Inefficient Duplication of Safety Interventions 
   14
  The analysis of medical products policy has generally not focused on the degree to which 
private or court mechanisms may duplicate the regulatory activities of the FDA (Shavell, 2005; 
Viscusi, 2005).  In Philipson and Sun (2007), we examined the welfare implications of this 
duplication for the medical products regulated by the FDA. Consider a situation in which a 
regulatory agency mandates a binding level of investment in a given activity, like the intensity of 
clinical testing, the manufacturing practices the firm must follow, or the extent of warnings about 
the product, which is higher than what product liability alone would induce for that activity.   
This binding level may be higher or lower than any efficient level; the key is that is higher than 
the level of investment product liability alone would provide, and is therefore binding.  
Moreover, this level of activity may be costless in the sense of not consuming any resources, as 
is the potentially the case with the firm’s choice of warnings.     
Given that the FDA’s mandated level of investment is binding, product liability does not 
have additional deterrence effect beyond the FDA’s regulations.  However, product liability 
raises firms’ costs and therefore product prices, since it requires firms to pay damages to 
consumers, and this increase in price for no corresponding gain in product safety reduces social 
welfare. For example, firms seldom do more clinical testing than what the FDA requires, which 
suggests that at least for this investment in safety, product liability may sometimes duplicate the 
role of the FDA.  This argument implies a possible rationale for a rule which makes 
manufacturers exempt from product liability for FDA-regulated activities, such as pre-clinical 
testing and manufacturing. The argument seems to imply that for drugs, although not devices, the 
joint safety regulation for design- and manufacturing defects, may be more efficient as FDA is 
more, though not a complete, safe harbor in those cases. However, for devices in general or 
liability over failure to warn for drugs, there seems to more of an inefficient duplication.   15
In Philipson and Sun (2007), we calibrated the potential welfare gains from a product 
liability exemption for those activities that are regulated by FDA.  To illustrate the main 
argument, suppose that firms’ liability costs account for x percent of marginal costs, so that a 
product liability exemption would eliminate these legal costs and reduce firms’ costs by x 
percent.  Together with a given demand structure, such price reductions would imply standard 
welfare increases. We considered an elasticity of demand for drugs of 1.25 based on our 
calculations using patent expiration evidence.
2 This evidence (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; 
Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches, 1996; Caves, 1991), documents supply-induced price changes 
and the resulting change in quantities demanded. Then, using standard calculations with data on 
drug sales, we can convert the reduction in marginal costs from liability exemption to reductions 
in price and gains in welfare (Philipson and Sun, 2007).   We used lifetime projected sales data 
on a sample of 663 drugs that were on the U.S. market between February 1998 and December 
2002, with total sales of $1,149 billion.   Details on how lifetime sales data from these drugs was 
calculated can be found in Philipson et al. (2005).  
Figure 2 shows the resulting calibrated welfare gains from a product liability exemption.  
At the lower end, if liability accounts for 5 percent of a drug’s costs, then a product liability 
exemption would increase consumer welfare by $47.8 billion (4 percent of sales), producer 
surplus by $11.9 billion (1 percent of sales), and total surplus by $59.7 billion (5 percent of 
sales).  On other hand, suppose that liability accounts for 50% of a drug’s costs.  In that case, a 
product liability exemption would increase consumer welfare by $754.7 billion (66 percent of 
sales), producer welfare by $173.9 billion (15 percent of sales), and total welfare by $928.6 
                                                 
2 This elasticity of demand differs from the co-pay elasticity of demand estimated by others (Goldman et al., 2006; 
Goldman et al., 2007), because the latter is the elasticity of demand from patients who already have insurance, and 
only need to pay their insurance copay for the drug.  Our elasticity of demand is the elasticity of demand facing the 
manufacturer, which takes into account the demand for health insurance itself. 
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billion (81 percent of sales).  Thus, these calibrations suggest that product liability exemption has 
the potential to increase welfare quite substantially, and naturally more so if liability costs 
account for a large percentage of a drug’s costs.  Moreover, the figure also reveals that the 
welfare gains from a product liability exemption are primarily driven by gains in consumer 
welfare, not gains in producer profits.   
These results suggest the possibility of substantial increases in consumer welfare when 
firms are exempted from product liability lawsuits for those activities that are well regulated by 
the FDA.  However, several points need to be addressed in evaluating this argument. First, the 
level of FDA regulation may interact with the existence of product liability. For example, 
perhaps the threat of liability prods the FDA to take a stronger stance on safety. Or perhaps if 
product liability did not exist, perhaps the FDA would increase safety further because it would 
then take full blame for product failures.  Second, drug safety is probably a function of several 
activities, such as pre-clinical testing, clinical testing, proper manufacturing, proper warnings, 
and post-market surveillance. Clearly, product liability may have a role for safety outside of the 
activities regulated directly by the FDA. In particular, regulations on the behavior of firms after 
the drug or medical product has reached the market are much harder to monitor and enforce and 
product liability may play a more productive role here. Third, the costs of duplication may have 
some corresponding benefits, making analysis of their relative size important. In general, more 
evidence is needed on the share of overall costs that go towards legal costs, but in the vivid case 
of the diptheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine, Manning (1994) estimated that liability initially 
accounted for 15 percent of the vaccine’s price and rose to 90 percent of the vaccine’s price as 
legal liabilities increased. However, with these concerns duly noted, it remains true that when   17
duplication exists between regulation and product liability, consumers in particular will suffer 
welfare losses from the corresponding price increases.  
Dynamic Efficiency and The Tradeoff between Safety and Time to Market 
As the value of new medical technologies may be very high, delays in their introduction 
is often particularly costly.  Therefore, looking at the degree of investment in product safety in a 
static sense does not take into account the reductions in dynamic welfare that occur by 
lengthening the time it takes for products to reach consumers.  In Philipson et al (2005), we 
discuss the exact welfare implications of this issue and provide a methodology of how to 
estimate the efficiency effects of the speed versus safety tradeoff that is perhaps the central 
tradeoff of the FDA.  In general, the dynamically optimal safety is lower than the statically 
optimal level due to the extra costs of delayed marketing of valuable technologies. 
As discussed earlier, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, along with its 
extensions in 1998 and 2003, were a series of acts that levied user fees on drug manufacturers, in 
exchange for faster review times. The effects of this act can be used to illustrate the speed-safety 
calculations discussed in Philipson et al (2005). While this legislation has been praised for 
reducing drug approval times, it has also been criticized for reducing the safety of drugs on the 
market (see a discussion in Institute of Medicine, 2006).  We argue that the gains in welfare from 
increased speed more than offset any losses in static efficiency from less safe drugs.
3   
The Effect on Speed 
                                                 
3 In evaluating the full impact of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 one may consider the revenue aspects 
as well and whether user fees imposed on drug firms should be substituted for general taxes funded by the general 
population consuming drugs. Using general taxes may lower the excess burden of taxation if the user fees distort 
R&D investments.  While this may be the case in principle, the distortions may be small given the small size of user-
fess to any expected sales from the drugs involved.    
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Figure 3 plots survival curves showing the percentage of what are called New Molecular 
Entities awaiting approval over time, with curve for the time periods when the first period when 
the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 was in effect and the period after it was first 
reauthorized, along with two earlier periods. Each curve shows the percentage of drugs 
submitted for approval that has not yet been acted upon within a given number of months after 
submission of the New Drug Application.  Survival curves from more recent time periods are 
clearly separate from and lower than are those from earlier periods.  The more rapid decline in 
survival curves after the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 indicates gains in 
speed.  The horizontal line designated with a 90 percent rate in the graph intersects the various 
survival curves at far longer time periods than those stated by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
of 1992, because the goals in the law involved review times rather than approval times. 
  We found that drug approval times fell by roughly 2 percent per year in the periods 
before 1992. After the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, approval times 




The Effect of Speed on Consumer and Producer Surplus 
Faster drug approval times will cause consumer and producer surplus gains to occur 
earlier. To get an idea of the effect of PDUFA on producer surplus, we returned to our data on 
life cycle sales and costs for a set of 663 drugs on the U.S. market between February 1998 and 
December 2002.  Given our estimates of the effect of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 
                                                 
4  We found that effects Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 on approval times do not vary significantly across 
drug classes.  Two exceptions are that during the period from 198 to 2003, after the legislation was reauthorized for 
the first time,, the annual declines in approval time for anti-inflammatory drugs and anti-neoplastic (chemotherapy) 
agents are significantly larger than for other drugs, with annual declines for the former approaching 15 percent, and 
annual declines for the latter reaching about 10 percent.     19
on drug approval times, we valued greater speed by asking how much the present value of 
welfare would increase by allowing the observed stream of surplus to happen sooner. Using this 
method for valuing speed, and a 3 percent discount rate, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 
1992 increased the present value of sales by roughly $15 billion (1.31 percent of sales) while 
also increasing costs by $3.89 billion (0.34 percent of sales).  Overall then, the reform of 1992 
increased producer surplus by roughly $11 billion (0.96 percent of sales).   
  Calibrating the effects of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 on consumer and 
social surplus was more complicated for two reasons. First, since consumer surplus must be 
inferred from quantity and price data alone, some assumptions on the nature of demand had to be 
made. Second, consumer surplus is lower before a patent expires and higher after it expires, since 
generic competition occurs, thereby reducing prices. Our major finding was that under a 3 
percent discount rate, the 1992 legislation increased the present value of social surplus by 
between $18-31 billion which amounts to about 1.6 to 2.7 percent of overall sales. 
The Effect on Safety 
These estimated increases in social surplus must be weighed against the potential losses 
due to the possibility of less safety in the drugs being released. We calculated how many life-
years were lost as a result of additional unsafe drugs.  
We used the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) to calculate the number of lives 
lost from drugs that were approved under the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts, but subsequently 
withdrawn.  AERS is a database maintained by the Food and Drug Administration which 
includes patient, physician, and drug-company initiated reports of adverse drug reactions.  
Specifically, AERS provides reports on patient deaths, which we used to estimate the number of 
life-years lost.  For each of the drugs that were approved under the Prescription Drug User Fee   20
Acts and subsequently withdrawn, we used AERS to calculate the number of fatalities attributed 
to these drugs during the entire time that they were on the market.  Overall, our analysis found 
that about 55,600 life-years were lost from drugs that were approved under the years of PDUFA 
but were subsequently withdrawn. A reasonable range of estimates for the value of a life-year 
would be from $100,000 to $300,000. Thus, the losses due to reduced safety would range from 
$5.6 billion to $16.6 billion.  Since the present value of social surplus was $18 billion to $31 
billion, the gains from increased speed likely outweigh the costs.  
Our estimate of costs is imperfect in a number of ways. For example, we look only at 
costs that involve loss of life, not the costs of causing illness.  In other words, we only examined 
the effect of PDUFA on mortality, but not morbidity.  This factor means that we tend to 
underestimate costs. On the other side, there are several reasons why our estimate would be 
biased toward overstating costs.  First, we assume that all deaths reported in AERS were directly 
caused by the specific drug in question. Second, our approach assumed that all drugs that were 
approved under the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts and later withdrawn would not have been 
approved at all in the absence of the acts.  Finally, our approach to estimating costs does not 
include the likelihood that the drugs withdrawn had health benefits to other consumers who were 
not adversely affected.  Taking these factors together, it seems plausible to us that before the 
enactment of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, safety was being overprovided at the 
expense of getting new medical products to consumers in a timely manner.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
Relatively little explicit research has been done by economists on the efficiency tradeoffs 
involved in the main policies of the Food and Drug Administration. Our discussion has brought   21
forward two main policy issues.  First, the static issue, which suggests that, given the existence 
of regulatory oversight through the FDA, there may be a case for a product liability exemption 
for manufacturers of new drugs and medical products – at least as related to tasks already well-
regulated by the FDA. Second, the dynamic issue of assessing the central speed safety tradeoff of 
the agency implies that the dynamically optimal level of safety is lower than the statically 
optimal one. The analysis we discussed suggests that speed of new product approval was 
underprovided before the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, although more analysis would 
be needed to see whether additional gains in speed at the expense of drug safety might be 
worthwhile. It is important to note that the analysis of both of these issues may extend more 
broadly to other markets as well. 
Our analysis also suggests several directions for future research. First, with regard to the 
static efficiency question of assuring the appropriate level of product safety through a 
combination of regulation and product liability, one important question is how product liability 
might be made more efficient. Damages in such cases are typically awarded by juries, who are 
not spending their own money.  If juries are likely to award inefficiently high damages, then 
pharmaceutical firms will produce products that are inefficiently too safe, or may exit the market 
entirely as has been observed in the case of vaccine development (Manning, 1994).  Another 
important question in this area is to examine is the incidence of liability costs under product 
liability.  Ultimately, the economic incidence of product liability falls on consumers, in the form 
of higher prices.  In effect, product liability acts as mandatory product insurance for consumers.  
However, this type of mandatory insurance may involve cross-subsidization or unfair pricing of 
risk. We believe more work needs to be done understanding the efficiency effects of this type of 
mandatory insurance, or “medical warranties”.      22
  Second, with regard to the dynamic efficiency analysis, there are many policies whose 
efficiency ultimately comes down to the evaluation of the discussed speed-safety tradeoff and 
should be analyzed as such.  For example, when the FDA requires certain labels and marketing 
regulations, this affects the speed safety tradeoff. Another example is the use of biomarkers, 
which are physical traits used to monitor the progress of a disease, e.g., the presence of a 
particular hormone, to replace traditional outcomes, such as mortality.  The tradeoff introduced 
by use of bio-markers is again the speed safety tradeoff; using the marker as an outcome in the 
clinical trial could reduce the length of time needed to conduct the trial, however, a shorter trial 
would also provide less information about safety.   
Third, another important general issue to analyze concerns off-label use of drugs --that is, 
use for indications that the drug has not been approved for by the FDA. Such use is legal, but 
little systematic evidence exists whether more unsafe use is entailed by such unregulated uses or 
about the speed with which such use diffuses to potential patients.  
Fourth, more analysis is needed on the impact of FDA and the value of procedural 
innovations. What often happens now is that new devices or drugs, which are patentable, require 
for their use a new medical procedure, which is not in itself patentable. The FDA approves the 
new devices or drugs, but only comments on the procedures in passing.  For example, stents are 
devices that are surgically implanted in a blood vessel in order to keep it open.  While the FDA 
has authority over the stents themselves, it has little authority over the surgical procedures used 
to place the stents.  An interesting question is how the FDA affects the incentive to innovate in 
procedures.  
More generally, although often commented on, explicit analysis of the efficiency effects 
of the policies of the Food and Drug Administration is not as well developed as for many other   23
regulatory agencies. However, it bears great promise. In an agency dominated by the thinking of 
doctors and lawyers, economic analysis can offer useful methods by which to produce more 
explicit- and evidence-based evaluation of its policies, mimicking better the high standards set 
for the products it oversees.   24
Figure 1  
An Overview of the Drug Development Process 
 
Sources : Dimasi et al (2003). 
Notes :   The line marked “overall probability” is the unconditional probability of reaching a given stage.  For 
example, 30% of drugs make it to phase I testing.  The line marked “conditional probability” shows the probability 
of advancing to the next stage of the process, conditional reaching a given stage.  For example, the probability of 
advancing to phase III testing conditional on starting phase II testing, is 48%.   
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Figure 2  














































Sources : Philipson and Sun (2007) 
Notes :  The increases in surplus as reported as a percentage of sales. Total sales for the sample of drugs we consider 
is $1,149 billion. 
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Figure 3  
Share of undecided applications as function of time pre- and post PDUFA 
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